During the twentieth century, England saw a dramatic increase in rates of immigration from parts of the Commonwealth, primarily due to the aftermath of the Second World War under the 1948 Nationality Act, allowing Commonwealth migrants to work unrestrictedly in the UK.[1] More than seventy years on, important questions remain unanswered surrounding the identity of these migrants and their children who are sometimes not viewed as English, although often born in England. Some scholars such as Schöpflin attribute these questions to inherent social class hierarchies within English identity and the migrants’ lack of status within them. However, most historiography roots the question of the migrants’ Englishness in the inherent xenophobia of the country. This xenophobia is largely the result of remnants of the Empire and the narratives created against migrants primarily to serve political motivations. It is worth noting here that ethnicity refers to the cultural identity (such as the language, history, and ancestry) of a group, whereas race refers to taxonomic groupings related to physical traits; both terms are relevant in this context however the key focus here will remain on ethnicity. Another term that will be used is ‘ethnically English’ which refers to people whose ancestry is rooted within England. Similarly, in the context of ethnic comparison from an imperial standpoint, the terms ‘Englishness’ and ‘Britishness’ may be used interchangeably to describe populations and characters often associated with both England and Britain. While some importance can be given to other factors such as inherent class structures and age within English identity, ultimately ethnicity has proven to be an internally uniting factor within the ethnically English people against the ‘alien’ others, both racially and ethnically different from the English.
It is first important to note how social class hierarchies may have some importance within English identity. In Nations, Identity, Power, Schöpflin argues that ethnicity is not as important of a factor as class when examining Englishness and the ‘sentimentalised symbols of identity’ that come with it.’[2] Instead, as Kennard presents, ‘he sees ethnicity as represented by class, or class as the locus for cultural reproduction.’[3] He argues that class exists as a powerful inherent component of English society and shapes how people view their identity within it:
‘Class in England has survived because regardless of what people say, it has a role and function in cultural reproduction that is hidden from view by the power relations encoded in it. Despite appearances to the contrary, class allows people a very high degree of security regarding their identity.’[4]
Interestingly, the use of the word ‘survived’ to describe class in England indicates an inherent resistance to it on some level that it must endure. Schöpflin argues that even though we say we want a classless society, we do not mean it. The inherent nature of class within English society makes it ‘hidden from view’ and therefore difficult to analyse and compare to the more explicit ethnic divisions within England. Writing in 2000, Schöpflin uses the previous century’s events surrounding ethnicity in South Africa (for example, Apartheid) and the United States (for example, the Civil Rights Movement) to make the comparison that England is unlike other countries in its preference of class over ethnicity. While he labels ethnicity and class as ‘functional equivalents’, he argues that countries such as South Africa and the United States function on a politically divisive standpoint, placing ethnicity at the forefront as a methodology of government whereas England uses class:
‘England is rare, subordinating ethnicity to class, and this has helped to make the country relatively open to migrants, exiles and other foreigners. They do not fit into the class system, at any rate not immediately, and they do not threaten it either […] The fact that blacks perceive the class system as racist is irrelevant in this context.’[5]
Although Schöpflin makes some curious insights into the reasons behind England’s seemingly ‘open’ immigration policy, he overlooks and essentialises difficulties facing the ‘migrants, exiles and other foreigners’ upon arrival in England, many of which stem from their foreign ethnicities. This idea is further cemented in his disregard of ‘blacks’ and their perception of a racist class system to be ‘irrelevant’. Additionally, Schöpflin highlights the role of the European Union as the antithesis to English hierarchical class structures, commenting on how ‘new forms of knowledge, new concentrations of social capital, new definitions of status can all be derived from EU membership.’[6] Writing in 2000, Schöpflin’s notion has since been somewhat disproven through the 2016 Brexit Referendum. While Schöpflin argues that class would unite the population against the threat of the E.U., the statistics from the Brexit Referendum demonstrate that the population was largely divided by age with over 70% of 18–24-year-olds voting to remain, despite the threat that the E.U. supposedly presents to the English class system.[7] Although the Vote Leave campaign highlighted many problems surrounding the economy and sovereignty that the UK supposedly faced while in the E.U., Gietel-Basten emphasises that primarily, ‘it was about gut-wrenching issues like borders, culture, and the homeland.’[8] The eventual exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union was the result of Britons wanting to ‘take back control’, with immigration being the ‘single strongest issue driving people to vote Leave.’[9] Combining this idea with the influence of age, one could suggest that age potentially plays a factor in one’s aversion to other ethnicities and immigration. Schöpflin’s argument ignores the influence of ethnicity as well as class within English consciousness and trivialises the multifaceted intersections of class and ethnicity. As Aughey suitably states:
‘The distinction made by Schöpflin between high-status ‘class’ and low-status ‘ethnicity’—explaining the growth of ‘feeling English’ as the displacement of the former by the latter—is far too simplistic. It ignores the complex intermingling of ideas that constitute a national identity.’[10]
Aughey furthers his critique and asserts that ‘for now it is the class consciousness in Englishness which acts as a brake on nationalism for England.’[11] This idea claims that Schöpflin not only disregards ethnicity as a factor but also attributes Englishness to its own obstacle through the inherent divisive qualities within the class system amongst ethnically English people.
Instead, common ethnicity offers a uniting influence to construct large aspects of English nationalism and identity. One reason for this is a result of the enduring memory of the British Empire and notions of racial superiority that were bolstered during its time, such as those presented in ‘The White Man’s Burden’ by Rudyard Kipling.[12] As Kumar states, ‘English nationalism, past and present, is the nationalism of an imperial state—one that carries the stamp of its imperial past even when the empire has gone.’[13] Many scholars examine the idea of migrants from the Commonwealth being tools for England instead of citizens of equal standing, particularly after the First and Second World Wars. Kumar continues,
‘There was a persistence of Empire until the second half of the century. There were two world wars in which all nations of the United Kingdom, the Empire and the Commonwealth fought side by side, and in which any insistence on English nationalism would have been as dangerous as it would have been distasteful.’[14]
During the global wars of the twentieth century, much of the British Army was formed of soldiers from territories within the Empire. One prominent example of the ethnic diversity of the British Army is the Fourteenth Army, ‘which consisted of Indians from every corner of the Raj, Gurkhas from Nepal, Kenyans, Nigerians, Rhodesians and Somalis, as well as men from Kent and Cumberland.’[15] Likewise, after the war, hundreds of workers from the then-British Caribbean were invited to migrate to Britain to fill labour shortages. However, the ensuing deportation of these migrants due to poor document management by the British government demonstrates a disposable mentality towards migrants in post-war Britain.[16] Collins articulates that ‘they were sojourners, not citizens, and from this perspective they occupied a clear position within the racial framework of the Empire-Commonwealth; they belonged to the colonial world, not the metropolitan.’[17] From this notion, one could argue that English nationalism was particularly bolstered in the post-Second World War era due to a combination of patriarchal pride from the war itself, as well as the unification of Britons against invaders challenging Britain as they know it, presented in both Axis countries as well as British subjects from overseas. As Colley summarises, the British ‘defined themselves, in short, not just through an internal and domestic dialogue but in conscious opposition to the Other beyond their shores.’[18] From this, one could argue that English national consciousness grew as a result of the simultaneously growing ‘Other’.
The 1960s onwards saw a sharp increase of Commonwealth immigrants in England, principally East African Asians fleeing persecution from Kenya and Uganda from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s due to exclusionary nationalist policies in the newly independent nations.[19] Despite being born abroad, many of these migrants possessed British passports, leaving the logical option to flee to Britain. Of course, this influx of migrants resulted in a strong backlash from the British population and government figures. A noteworthy example is Enoch Powell’s infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech delivered in 1968, which purportedly sought to report the shocking state of the country for the ‘quite ordinary working man’ due to the rise of immigration.[20] Although it received a colossal response from both opposers and supporters, the speech was only a fraction of racialised politics in England.[21] Manifestos containing policies to control immigration were common in the twentieth century such as the 1971 Immigration Act under the Conservative Party which ‘sought to effectively end primary immigration from the Commonwealth.’[22] Stocker also notes how this act ‘also introduced the notion of ‘partiality’, which discriminated in favour of immigrants from Australia, Canada and New Zealand over the rest of the (largely non-white) Commonwealth.’[23] Stocker raises the point that anti-immigration policies such as the 1971 Immigration Act, may be centred more around race than merely ethnicity and, in other words, reveals an aversion to a difference in physical traits rather than cultural identities.
It is worth noting the debate surrounding notions of race and ethnicity within historiography, particularly their origins and purpose. While convention places these concepts to be natural taxonomic groupings with which to categorise the population, many question their origins and purpose and argue that they are principally concepts used in tyrannical political narratives. Tabili labels race to be ‘a historical artifact’ and argues how ‘definitions of racial difference, like masculinity and femininity, have been sensitive to economic and political change, mediated by class and gender, and manipulated by elites in the pursuit of power.’[24] Similarly, Smith notes how ethnicity is used “instrumentally’ to further individual or collective interests, particularly of competing élites who need to mobilize large followings to support their goals in the struggle for power. In this struggle ethnicity becomes a useful tool.’[25] This idea is visible in a 1978 newspaper advert, supposedly promising equality for black people in Britain under the Conservative government.[26] Yet, in the same way that people from colonial territories were used as tools to fight and rebuild after the wars, their ethnicity and existence in England proved to be the greatest political tool to also unite the majority of the nation against them under the (often Conservative) Party. In a 1978 interview for Granada TV with Gordon Burns, Margaret Thatcher remarked that ‘if you want good race relations, you have got to allay people’s fears on numbers.’[27] These ‘fears on numbers’ were also the primary catalyst in the 2016 Brexit Vote Leave campaign’s victory, demonstrating how politics uses and incites a great deal of enduring xenophobia in the UK.
Another remnant from the age of the British Empire that encourages xenophobia is the belief in the existence of an ‘English character’ which is assumed to contain a set of characteristics surrounding democracy, imperialism, and defence. In the same interview for Granada TV, Thatcher expressed how ‘the British character has done so much for democracy, for law and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in.’[28] This formation of a British character working in parallel to the rest of the world and then endowed to the colonies encourages an exclusivity of the character for ethnically English people. This, in turn, extends to England itself and its land only being for those whose ethnicity reflects the ‘British character’. Similarly, Collins notes reflections of this exclusivity in the specific cultural identifier of cricket and how it ‘was used to re-articulate Englishness as culturally distinct and unobtainable to the immigrants and the formerly colonised subject.’[29]This establishes the exclusive nature of Englishness and its qualities being somewhat ‘gatekept’ from the formerly colonised, whether it takes the form of smaller cultural identifiers such as cricket or larger ones such as the land of the country itself.
Unless needed, immigration in England has been largely treated with contempt by the public and government and is often represented by a collection of statistics which those in power seek to lower. The influence of the Empire is often overlooked when considering the stories of migrants and, as Stocker claims, ‘the crimes committed in its Empire are conveniently forgotten and the xenophobic attitudes which have run through British society for centuries are generally ignored.’[30] Britain’s involvement in the histories of many nations is often omitted when addressing immigration, leading to confusion from the public surrounding the migrants’ presence in England which in turn creates the xenophobia and ignorance towards them. Kellas makes an interesting comparison of the United Kingdom to the United States, stating how ‘Britain is also less receptive to multi-culturalism, seeing itself not as a ‘melting-pot’ of immigrants, but as an old-established ‘nation-state’ essentially English in character.’[31] The desire to hold on to this English character forms the basis for the idea of Englishness which those of different ethnicities are intentionally left out of. It is worth mentioning, however, that former Prime Minister David Cameron made some attempt to address this in a 2014 article, highlighting ‘British values.’ In this list, he names ‘a belief in freedom, tolerance of others, accepting personal and social responsibility,’ and ‘respecting and upholding the rule of law’.[32] Although the article was largely written in response to reports of Islamic extremism in schools, the report also mentioned teaching Britain’s history in schools ‘warts and all’, suggesting a break from the convenient forgetting of the history of the Empire. Nine years on, however, Britain’s imperial history is not compulsory to be taught in schools meaning the ignorance of the migrants’ stories continues along with the spread of xenophobia and the exclusionary nature of Englishness.
In conclusion, ethnicity is very important when considering Englishness as it has formed part of the cultural identity of Britain, creating a national consciousness in opposition to others. While class plays a factor in perpetuating divisive norms within British society, ethnicity and the racism and xenophobia it can come with play a bigger role in uniting the country against ‘alien’ peoples. This is largely due to the overlooking of the support from migrant workers and soldiers in the twentieth century, along with the absence of widespread education on the extent of injustices in Britain’s imperial history. This same imperial history brought about the notion of a ‘British character’ encompassing democracy and superiority on the global stage which has been referenced by political leaders as a further uniting tool. While Thatcher’s usage surrounded a uniting tool against immigration, Cameron used the term to unite all people in Britain against extremism, suggesting a level of inclusion of migrants in the UK in the unification against a new enemy.
Japneet Hayer has recently completed an MA in History at the University of Nottingham.
Notes: [1] A. M. Messina, ‘The Impacts of Post-WWII Migration to Britain: Policy Constraints, Political Opportunism and the Alteration of Representational Politics,’ The Review of Politics, 63/2, (2001), p. 263. [2] G. Schöpflin, Nations, Identity, Power (London, 2000), p. 320. [3] A. Kennard, ‘Review: Nations, Identity, Power,’ Scottish Affairs, No. 38 (2002), p. 137. [4] Schöpflin, Nations, Identity, Power, pp. 311-2. [5] Ibid., p. 317. [6] Ibid., p. 319. [7] D. Walker, ‘How young and old would vote on Brexit now,’ BBC (2018), <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45098550>, accessed 12/05/2023. [8] S. Gietel-Basten, ‘Why Brexit? The Toxic Mix of Immigration and Austerity,’ Population and Development Review, Vol. 42, No. 4 (2016), p. 678. [9] A. Garrett, ‘The Refugee Crisis, Brexit, and the Reframing of Immigration in Britain,’ Europe Now (2019),https://www.europenowjournal.org/2019/09/09/the-refugee-crisis-brexit-and-the-reframing-of-immigration-in-britain/, accessed 28/04/2023. [10] A. Aughey, ‘Englishness as class: A re-examination’, Ethnicities, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2012), p. 402. [11] Ibid., p. 405. [12] Rudyard Kipling, ‘The White Man’s Burden’, The Times, (London, 1899). [13] K. Kumar, ‘Nation and Empire: English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective’, Theory and Society, Vol. 29, No. 5 (2000), p. 577. [14] Ibid. p. 592. [15] A. Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London, 2006), p. 2. [16] Akala, ‘The Great British Contradiction’, RSA Journal, Vol. 164, No. 2 (2018), p. 19. [17] M. Collins, ‘Cricket, Englishness and Racial Thinking,’ The Political Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 1 (2022), p. 98. [18] L. Colley, ‘Britishness and Otherness: An Argument’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1992), p. 316. [19] J. Portes, S. Burgess, J. Anders, ‘The long-term outcomes of refugees: tracking the progress of the East African Asians,’ Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2020), p. 3. [20] E. Powell, ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech (delivered in Birmingham, 1968), <https://anth1001.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/enoch-powell_speech.pdf>, accessed 28/04/2023. [21] R. Shepherd, Enoch Powell: A Biography (London, 1996), p. 353. [22] P. Stocker, English Uprising (London, 2017), p. 54. [23] Ibid., p. 54. [24] L. Tabili, ‘The Construction of Racial Difference in Twentieth-Century Britain: The Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order, 1925,’ Journal of British Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1994), p. 59. [25] A. D. Smith, National Identity (London, 1991), p. 20. [26] ‘Labour Says He’s Black. Tories Say He’s British’ Advert, Saatchi & Saatchi (1978). [27] TV Interview for Granada World in Action (1978), <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103485>, accessed 28/04/2023. [28] Ibid. [29] Collins, ‘Cricket, Englishness and Racial Thinking,’ p. 96. [30] Stocker, English Uprising, p. 18. [31] J. G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London, 1991), p. 105. [32] D. Cameron, ‘British Values’, Mail on Sunday (2014) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-values-article-by-david-cameron>, accessed 30/04/2023.
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