Upon the collapse of the Tsarist regime in Russia in 1917, the Bolsheviks were tasked with confronting the ‘national question’ - that is, how to incorporate the former Russian Empire’s “hundreds of ethnic groups” into a “multiethnic society”.[1] The South Caucasus—or Transcaucasia[2]—is “one of the most multiethnic regions in the world”.[3] Largely comprised of Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians, with significant minorities such as Abkhazians, Adzharians, Mingrelians, and Ossetians[4], one would expect that, to integrate this ethnoculturally heterogenous region of the former Russian Empire into a successful socialist state, Lenin and, ultimately, Stalin would enforce an equally variegated nationality policy.
However, upon a thorough examination, whilst Stalin’s nationality policy in the South Caucasus was, indeed, varied, it also proved uniform in part. Stalinist nationality policy exploited an ethnofederal system that disproportionately advanced more autonomous nations, namely the dominant ethnic Union Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia vis-a-vis less autonomous titular republics such as Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh.
Thus, this paper argues that the extent to which Stalin’s nationality policy in the South Caucasus differed, depending on ethnic group, was broad, contingent upon a nationality’s position within the ethnically federalised structure of the Soviet Union. This provides both parallels in nationality policy, but most significantly, clear deviations where necessary to advance Stalin’s ends. In this view, whilst, of course, there are both parallels and deviations in policy towards the more autonomous states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, the greatest differences are evident in the nationality policies towards the less autonomous nationality of Abkhazia and the people of Nagorno Karabakh.
To this end, this paper will proceed by providing an assessment, and historical context, of Soviet nationality policy from 1917 to 1941[5] through two dimensions: the more autonomous nations of Transcaucasia—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia—and the less autonomous nations of Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh. Despite Stalin’s central role in the conceptual formulation of nationality policy under Lenin[6], this paper understands Stalin’s nationality policy to be the policies implemented after Lenin’s death in 1924.
Firstly, this paper will historically and theoretically contextualise Soviet nationality policy, from its inception under Lenin, its deployment, to its eventual cessation under Stalin. Secondly, an evaluation of Stalin’s nationality policy towards the South Caucasus titular nations of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia will demonstrate both its parallels and differences, whilst evidencing an adverse weighting against Azerbaijanis. Ultimately, a comparative assessment of Stalinist nationality policy towards Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh, will bespeak the ways in which nationality policy deviated significantly, dependent on ethnic group.
To provide a comprehensive assessment of Stalin’s nationality policy towards nations in the South Caucasus, dependent on its respective autonomy, an overview of the historical and theoretical context in which Soviet nationality policy emerged and evolved is pertinent.
One of the most pressing issues facing the fledgling Soviet Union, in 1917, was to tackle the ‘national question’. In essence, how to establish a means of “develop[ing]...new forms of political organization for the country’s multiethnic population”.[7] The Bolsheviks were guided by two initial central concerns regarding a nationality policy to establish a multiethnic state. Firstly, the Bolsheviks held nationalism to be a “dangerous idea” to the federal structure, engendering secessionist and independence sentiments, that must be appropriately addressed and nullified before the proper implementation of socialism.[8] Crucially, the Bolsheviks were wary to avoid being “seen as simply re-defined Russian imperialists”, a concern Lenin identified as “Great Russian chauvinism”.[9] Importantly, for Stalin, native nationalism was a far greater danger than Russian nationalism.[10]
Initial Soviet policies regarding state formation were significantly affected by Joseph Stalin’s 1913 article ‘Marxism and the National Question’, commissioned by Lenin.[11] The central tenet of Stalin’s article was his definition of a nation:
“a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”[12]
Stalin’s position as an ethnic Georgian, a minority within Russia, led to him becoming “the most significant figure in determining the structure of the Soviet state”.[13] This ethnocentric perspective led to Stalin‘s creation of what Ben Fowkes aptly describes as the structure of ”Soviet ethnofederalism”.[14] The embracing of ethnofederalism as a state structure for the Soviet Union, after 1917, was based principally in this “Stalinist linkage of ethnicity, territory, and political administration...enshrined in the idea of national statehood.”[15]
The Soviet federal structure institutionalised ethnicity through the creation of ethnicity-based titular entities with differing levels of autonomy.[16] The federal hierarchy, in descending order, was: (1) Union Republics such as Georgian[17], Armenian[18] and Azerbaijanian SSRs[19], as well as the Transcaucasian SFSR[20]; (2) autonomous republics such as the Abkhazian ASSR; (3) autonomous oblasts namely the South Ossetian SAO within the Georgian SSR; and (4) okrugs.
For Lenin, “nationalism and separatism were neither natural nor inevitable” but rather an oppressive byproduct of imperialism, “reflect[ing] only the interests of the bourgeoisie”, thus initially rejecting the idea of national federalism.[21] However, Lenin, and Stalin, appreciated that ”the cultural autonomy”, provided upon the ”institutionalisation of ethnoterritorial divisions with the creation of a quasi-federal Soviet state system”, would ”provide legitimacy” to Bolshevik rule.[22] Thus, to consolidate the multiethnic structure of the Soviet Union, and successfully attract support for Bolshevism from non-Russians, Lenin adopted the political strategy of korenisatziya or ”indigenization” in 1923, based upon his principle of ”the right of nations to self-determination".[23]
Korenisatziya aimed to integrate non-Russian peoples into the Soviet system through developmental education and cultural autonomy, whilst also utilising it as an apparatus for containing Great Russian chauvinism.[24] Korenisatziya became official Soviet policy in 1923[25], mandating the: (a) promotion of the usage of native languages in native administrations; (b) obligatory education for workers to learn native languages; (c) establishment of native-language schools; (d) issue of newspapers, journals, and books in native languages; and crucially (e) the introduction of indigenous non-Russian populations into the cadres of government.[26] Suny surmises the policy of korenisatziya as the ”consolidation of nationality” through three important processes: the state ”support of native languages, the creation of a national intelligentsia and political elite, and the formal institutionalisation of ethnicity in [the] state apparatus.”[27]
Furthermore, korenisatziya was a successful apparatus of “divide-and-rule".[28] The Soviet government tasked the titular nations[29] with ”the imposition and the maintenance of control over ethnic minorities”. This allowed local party cadres to ”pursue the national policies of forced assimilation, demographic dilution, and cultural genocide of the ethnic minorities within [the] framework of [korenizatsiya] policy”[30], for example the cadres of Georgian SSR vis-a-vis the Abkhazians. In effect, Soviet nationality policy exacerbated ethnic tensions and inequalities to consolidate its overarching political control.
Stalinist nationality policy largely followed that which was implemented under Lenin until 1928. However, during this time, Stalin increasingly preferred a statist understanding of nationhood—that of ‘socialism in one country’—which opposed the established ethnic understanding. Historians, such as Blitstein, identity Stalin’s consolidation of power—the implementation of the First Five-Year Plan and the initiation of the ‘Revolution from Above’—as a “crucial turning point” in nationality policy[31], for the contradictions of a statist and ethnic approach to nationhood intensified amidst industrialization and the ‘war on backwardness’.[32]
The early 1930s saw korenisatziya flourish, with a renewed reaffirmation from Stalin that the ‘Revolution from Above’ did not equate to the “abolition of ethnic distinctions”.[33] Rather, ethnic cultures would continue to “blossom” in a state of “socialism in one country”.[34] However, nation-building efforts all but ceased in 1934, precipitated, as suggested by Gerhard Simon, by Stalin’s mistrust of non-Russians.[35] Simultaneously, korenisatziya was ”denounced” as an existential ’threat to Soviet unity’.[36] By the culmination of the Great Purge of 1936-1938, korenizatsiya had, by and large, been replaced by xenophobic Russification.[37]
To assess the difference in Stalinist nationality policy depending on different ethnic groups, it is requisite to set parameters for measuring the implementation of korenisatizya in the titular nations. As identified by Fowkes, korenisatziya sought to implement native non-Russians into the cadres of government, establish native-language schools, and promote the cultural autonomy of the nationalities.[38] Thus, the parameters within which to assess the extent nationality policy was implemented in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and, subsequently, Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh, will be through the quantitative and qualitative analysis of party membership by ethnicity, linguistic education and cultural development, and political repression.
Analysing party membership by ethnicity in the more autonomous Union Republics of the South Caucasus reveals a relative uniformity in Stalinist nationality policy. A 1924 report on government institutions in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi revealed that ethnic Georgians accounted for 36% of the city’s population, 54% of all posts in government institutions, and 67% of the overall republican population.[39] By 1927, testament to the successes of korenisatziya, Georgians equalled 74% of all working within republican and government institutions in Tbilisi. Suny identifies that in the decade 1922 to 1932, the implementation of korenisatziya managed to increase the native integration into the Soviet regime.[40]
New native Bolshevik cadres formed from the former opposition parties, such as the Georgian Mensheviks, the Armenian Dashnaks, and the Azerbaijani Mussavists, increasing the already high percentages of native cadres in government.[41] For example, Georgians increased their share from 62% to 66%; 89% to 90% in Armenia; and 39% to 44% in Azerbaijan.[42][43] Similarly, Gerhard Simon identifies that, by 1929, representation of the native population had filtered into both the cadres of the republic and the raion. For instance, in Armenia, Armenians controlled 93.5% of the republic and 94.6% of raions; Georgians 74% and 81% respectively in their region; and Azerbaijan 36% and 69% respectively.[44] Overall, in the Union Republics of Transcaucasia, korenisatziya achieved an increase in usage of native languages, employing a universal approach.
The scope of korenisatziya’s implementation can also be discerned through an analysis of linguistic education and cultural development. The ‘Georganisation’ process implemented from 1922 to 1931 saw ethnic Georgians continue to improve their position in education, administration, and government, facilitated through an increase in Georgian literacy.[45] By 1926, over 96% of ethnic Georgians claimed Georgian as their first language.[46] In Armenia, korenisatziya brought relative peace, ceasing fighting over the territory.[47] It also facilitated the creation of a haven for the Armenian diaspora. Stalinist nationality policy not only ”allowed the Armenian language and... culture to strike deep roots” but it also served to reverse the Russification of the Armenian cadre.[48] Prior to korenisatziya, many of the Armenian elite had a ”tenuous grasp of their ancestral language”.[49]
For Azerbaijan, as with Armenia and Georgia, the establishment of a ”state apparatus endowed with the features of a modern nation-state...provided a sense of political and sociocultural security” for their respective titular nation.[50] For Azerbaijanis, by 1934, the ”net result” of Stalinist nationality policy was the ”creation of an ethnic administrative elite” that remained durable until the collapse of the Soviet Union.[51] Furthermore, the proliferation of cultural representations encouraged nation-building within the more autonomous titular nations. The status of “titular nationality”, as a Union republic, afforded the given ethnic community the “cultural hegemony within its own territory”. For instance, the formation of the Azerbaijani Writers’ Union in 1934 afforded the Azerbaijani’s the agency to “organize and regulate the production of Soviet Azerbaijani literature”.[52] Similar cultural production drives, such as establishing creative unions of artists, and writers, were evident in Armenia and Georgia.[53]
Whilst it is important to assess the intended effects of korenisatziya in assessing the difference in Stalinist nationalist policy vis-a-vis different ethnic groups, it is also critical to assess the extent to which Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians were politically repressed by Stalin. This represents a clear deviation from the original Stalinist doctrine inherited from, and formulated with, Lenin, and signifies a resolute shift in policy away from Lenin’s fear of Russian nationalism to Stalin’s preoccupation with the threat non-Russian nationalism. We can understand Stalin’s policy of terror to be conducted through Lavrentiy Beria, another native Georgian[54], who served as the first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party from 1934 to 1938.
Stalin’s “Great Terror” of 1936-1938 affected Transcaucasia, repressing nationalism for fear of anti-Soviet agitation and secessionist intent. In Georgia, according to a secret report from Beria to Stalin in October 1937, more than 12,000 Georgians were arrested, of which 7,374 were convicted.[55] There are also estimates to suggest that over 10,000 Georgians were sentenced to death by a Special Troika, instructed by Beria and Stalin.[56] In Armenia, the terror commenced in 1936 when Beria had Aghasi Khanjian, the first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party, killed to win the power struggle the two were engaged in.[57] Between 1937-1938 alone, Beria oversaw the execution of 4,530 Armenians, and the purge of some 8,837.[58] Azerbaijan, too, was subject to the repressions of the Great Terror. In June 1937, the Politburo adopted a quota for 1,000 to be executed, and 3,000 to be expelled.[59] The Troika decided, instead, to have 1,500 executed, 3,750 imprisoned, and 150 families evicted.[60]
Stalinist nationality policy towards the more autonomous titular nations has been shown to be uniform in its consistency for advancing the promotion of native non-Russians into the cadres of government, promoting the ethnolinguistic culture of the native peoples and utilising its celebration as a means to ingratiate non-Russians into the Soviet Union. Moreover, once korenisatziya had all but died, Stalin retained an element of uniformity in his approach[61] of repressing the more autonomous titular nations of Transcaucasia.
To demonstrate the varying degrees in which Stalinist nationality policy differed, depending on ethnic group, vis-a-vis the more autonomous titular nations, it is requisite to assess nationality policy in the less autonomous titular nations of Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh, to the same proscribed parameters.
Table 1: Demographic changes in Abkhazia[62]
In 1921, the Bolshevik regime established Abkhazia as a Union Republic, and it became a constituent of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic the following year. Both Russian and Abkhazian was designated as official languages in the republic.[63] A 1925 treaty recognized the equality of rights of Georgians and Abkhazians with Abkhazia unifying with the Georgian republic.[64] The same year, Stalin introduced the Latin script to Abkhazia to develop the indigenous literature.
However, unlike with the more autonomous republics, Stalin disregarded korenisatziya in Abkhazia to enable Beria to consolidate his power grab over the South Caucasus. For example, between 1933 and 1939, the Georgian authorities imposed a “comprehensive integrationist anti-Abkhazian policy” centred upon “cultural genocide and mass settlement of Karvelians in Abkhazia”. The Abkhazian script was changed from Latin to Georgian, teaching of, and in, Abkhazian was prohibited, and Abkhazian schools closed, Abkhazian literature publications were banned and, by the end of 1938, the Abkhazian cultural elite had been eliminated. This policy of anti-Abkhaz coincided with the process of Georgianisation, resulting in Abkhazians becoming a minority in Abkhazia by 1939. The effects of anti-Abkhaz integrationist policy vis-a-vis Georgianisation can be evidenced through the demographic changes in Abkhazia, displayed in Table 1.[65]
The development, and subsequent repression, of the Abkhaz nationality can also be demonstrated in its membership of the party cadres and demographic shifts. Under the initial korenizatsiya, ethnic Abkhaz were promoted into the Communist Party. Between 1922 and 1926, ethnic Abkhaz grew from 8% to 27.8% of the population, with membership in the party jumping from 10% to 25.4%.[66] By 1936, the autonomy of Abkhazian leader Nestor Lakoba was nonexistent. As with overseeing the murder of Armenian Communist Party leader Khanjian, Beria also participated in the murder of Lakoba in 1936.[67] Beria was, essentially, given carte blanche to implement Georgianisation, the most visible aspect of such being the increased migration of Mingrelian Georgians into Abkhazia. In 1926, Abkhazians made up 28% of the Abkhaz population, Georgia 34%.[68] By 1939, this figure was at 18% and 30% respectively.[69]
The approach of development and subsequent suppression was also evident in Nagorno Karabakh. In 1923, Nagorno Karabakh was granted the status of an autonomous region within Azerbaijan, having been under Armenian control since 1920.[70] Following its incorporation into Azerbaijani, the native authorities began implementing discriminatory practices to displace Armenians in the region. As the titular nationality of the union republic, Azerbaijan thus controlled the cultural, political, and educational cadres of Nagorno Karabakh.[71] These policies oversaw a steady depletion of Armenians from Nagorno Karabakh—an enforced ethnic cleansing resultant from Stalinist nationality policy. For instance, in 1921 Armenians accounted for 94.4% of the population of Nagorno Karabakh.[72] By 1939, this number had depleted to 88.1%.[73] The process has been referred to as Nakhichevanization.[74]
An assessment of both Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh reveals the ways in which Stalinist nationalist policy deviated from its relative uniformity, as seen in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, to contradict the tenets of korenisatziya. Whilst Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian literature, culture, and political status was celebrated and encouraged, Abkhazians were denounced and demoted from their titular position, a deviation not seen elsewhere in the South Caucasus. For the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh, a similar process of ethnic cleansing known as ‘Nakichevanization’ suppressed their ability to promote their culture, politics, and education vis-a-vis the Azerbaijani authorities.
In conclusion, the extent to which Stalin’s nationality policy in the South Caucasus, depending on ethnic group, has been demonstrated to be broad, varying from uniformity in policy towards the more autonomous republics, to significant deviations and anti-ethnic policies when assessing Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh. Whilst it has been shown that the effects of korenisatziya differed within the Union Republics of Transcaucasia, with a weighting in favour of Armenia and Georgia at the expense of Azerbaijan, it has been shown these are not resultant from a different policy approach.
However, when assessing the position of Nagorno Karabakh, and, in particular, Abkhazia, a different interpretation of korenisatziya becomes apparent. The cultural national autonomy of Abkhazians and Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh was ceded by Stalin to the respective dominant ethnic titular, Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively, to enforce the ethnofederal structure of ‘divide-and-rule'. In this view, korenisatziya in the South Caucasus was not uniformly implemented and thus has been proven to differ greatly contingent upon ethnic group. More specifically, Stalin’s nationality policy differed depending on an ethnic group’s standing in the ethnofederal structure of the Soviet Union.
Will Kingston-Cox is currently in his 3rd year of a BA in History and Politics at the University of Warwick.
Notes: [1] Matthew Lerner, ‘The Soviet Riviera: The Impact of Soviet Nationality Policy on Abkhazia, 1921-1953', Master’s research paper, University of Carleton, (2016), p. 15; Peter A. Blitstein, ‘Stalin’s Nations: Soviet Nationality Policy between Planning and Primordialism, 1936-1953', PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley (1999), p. 2 [2] Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian SSRs federated into Transcaucasian SFSR in 1922 [3] Alexander Murinson, ‘The secessions of Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabagh. The Roots and patterns of development of post-Soviet micro-secessions in Transcaucasia’, Central Asian Survey, 23(1), (2004), p.7 [4] Admittedly, this is not a comprehensive list of all ethnic groups in the South Caucasus existent under the Soviet Union. For instance, the Lezgins, Yezidis, and Jews are omitted. [5] “By the outset of the Great Patriotic War, a permament shift” in korenizatsiya nationality policy was evident; in Matthew Lerner, ‘The Soviet Riviera: The Impact of Soviet Nationality Policy on Abkhazia, 1921-1953', Master’s research paper, University of Carleton, (2016), p. 22 [6] 1917-1921; even prior as Bolshevik thinker [7] Mark Saroyan, ‘Beyond the Nation-State: Culture and Ethnic Politics in Soviet Transcaucasia’, The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 15(2-3), (1988), p. 220 [8] Matthew Lerner, ‘The Soviet Riviera: The Impact of Soviet Nationality Policy on Abkhazia, 1921-1953', Master’s research paper, University of Carleton, (2016), p. 15 [9] Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ‘Chickens Coming Home to Roost: A Perspective on Soviet Ethnic Relations’, Journal of International Affairs, 42(2), (1992), pp. 519-548 cited in Lerner, ‘The Soviety Riviera’, p. 15; Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 2 [10] Ronald G. Suny, ‘State-Building and Nation Making: The Evolution of Ethnonationalism under Soviet Rule’, The National Council for Soviet and East European Research, (1992), p. 28 [11] Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 17-18 [12] Joseph Stalin, Works, Vol. 2, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), p. 307 cited in Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, pp. 17-18; see also Stalin, ‘Marksizm I Natsionalniy Vopros’, 296 [13] Stephen Kotkin, Stalin, Vol. 1: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928, (New York City: Penguin, 2014), p. 349 cited in Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, p. 18 [14] Ben Fowkes, ‘The Evolution of Soviet Nationality Policy: The Epoch of Indigenization’ in The Disintegration of the Soviet Union: A Study in the Rise and Triumph of Nationalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), p. 41 [15] Mark Saroyan, ‘Beyond the Nation-State: Culture and Ethnic Politics in Soviet Transcaucasia’, The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 15(2-3) (1988), p. 221 [16] Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2001), p. 25 cited in Nevzat Torun, ’Soviet Nationality Policy: Impact on Ethnic Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, Karadeniz Arasturmalari, 9(70) (2021), p. 253 [17] 1921-1922; 1936-1991 [18] 1920-1922; 1936-1990 [19] 1920-1922; 1936-1991 [20] 1922-1936; formed of Armenian, Azerbaijanian, and Georgian SSRs [21] Ronald G. Suny, ‘State-Building and Nation Making: The Evolution of Ethnonationalism under Soviet Rule’, The National Council for Soviet and East European Research (1992), p. 4 [22] Alexander Murinson, ‘The secessions of Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabagh. The Roots and patterns of development of post-Soviet micro-secessions in Transcaucasia’, Central Asian Survey, 23(1) (2004), p. 19 [23] Nevzat Torun,’ Soviet Nationality Policy: Impact on Ethnic Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, Karadeniz Arasturmalari, 9(70) (2021), p. 250 [24] Ibid. [25] At the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party - Matthew Lerner, ‘The Soviet Riviera: The Impact of Soviet Nationality Policy on Abkhazia, 1921-1953', Master’s research paper, University of Carleton (2016), p. 20 [26] Ben Fowkes, ‘The Evolution of Soviet Nationality Policy: The Epoch of Indigenization’ in The Disintegration of the Soviet Union: A Study in the Rise and Triumph of Nationalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), p. 46 [27] Ronald G. Suny, ‘State-Building and Nation Making: The Evolution of Ethnonationalism under Soviet Rule’, The National Council for Soviet and East European Research (1992), p. 25 [28] See Philip Roeder, ’Soviet federalism and ethnic mobilization’, in Rachel Denber (ed.), The Soviet Nationality Reader (Boulder, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 2-5 [29] Soviet terminology for a political administrative unit dominated by a single ethnic group – applicable to Union Republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), autonomous republics (Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh) and autonomous oblasts (South Ossetia) [30] Alexander Murinson, ‘The secessions of Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabagh. The Roots and patterns of development of post-Soviet micro-secessions in Transcaucasia’, Central Asian Survey, 23(1) (2004), p. 19 [31] Peter A. Blitstein, ‘Stalin’s Nations: Soviet Nationality Policy between Planning and Primordialism, 1936-1953', PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley (1999), p. 8 [32] Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), ch. 5 cited in Peter A. Blitstein, ‘Stalin’s Nations: Soviet Nationality Policy between Planning and Primordialism, 1936-1953', PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley (1999), p. 8 [33] Blitstein, ‘Stalin’s Nations’, p. 8 [34] Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, (New York City: International Publishers, n.d.), pp. 261-263 cited in Blitstein, ‘Stalin’s Nations’, p. 8 [35] Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991): p. 138 cited in Richard Terrell, ‘Soviet Nationality Policy and National Identity in the Transcaucasian Republics: Drawing Together or Tearing Apart?’, Master’s thesis, University of Indiana (1993), p. 15 [36] Richard Terrell, ‘Soviet Nationality Policy and National Identity’, p. 16 [37] Peter A. Blitstein, ‘Stalin’s Nations: Soviet Nationality Policy between Planning and Primordialism, 1936-1953', PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley (1999), pp. 95-96 [38] Ben Fowkes, The Disintegration of the Soviet Union: A Study in the Rise and Triumph of Nationalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), p. 46 [39] Stephen Jones, ‘The Establishment of Soviet Power in Transcaucasia: The Case of Georgia 1921-1928, Soviet Studies, 40(4) (1988), p. 625 [40] Ronald G. Suny, ‘State-Building and Nation Making: The Evolution of Ethnonationalism under Soviet Rule’, The National Council for Soviet and East European Research (1992), p. 26 [41] Ibid., pp. 21-22, 26 [42] Ibid., p. 26 [43] Fowkes, The Disintegration of the Soviet Union, p. 49 [44] Gerhard Simon, Nationalismus und Nationalitatenpolitik in der Sowjetunion: Von toltalitaren Dikatur zur nachstalinschen Gesselchaft (Baden-Baden Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986), p. 51 [45] Stephen Jones, ‘The Establishment of Soviet Power in Transcaucasia: The Case of Georgia 1921-1928, Soviet Studies, 40(4) (1988), p. 620 [46] Ibid. [47] Fowkes, The Disintegration of the Soviet Union.p. 48 [48] Ibid. [49] Ibid. [50] Mark Saroyan, ‘Beyond the Nation-State: Culture and Ethnic Politics in Soviet Transcaucasia’, The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 15(2-3) (1988), p. p. 221 [51] Ibid. [52] Ibid., p. 223 [53] Ibid. [54] Beria was, in fact, a Mingrelian; ethnographers in the Soviet Union at the time regularly classified Mingrelians as a subethnicity within Georgians; see Francine Hirsch, ’The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality from the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses’, Slavic Review, 56(2), (1997): 251-278 [55] Levan Avalishvili, ‘The “Great Terror” of 1937-1938 in Georgia: Between the Two Reports of Lavrentiy Beria’, Caucasus Analytical Digest, 22(1) (2010), pp. 2-6 [56] Appendix to the Archival Bulletin, ‘Correspondence Between L. Beria and J. Stalin (1937), The Journal of Archive Administration of MOIA, no. 3, (2008) [57] Eduard Melkonian, ‘Repressions in 1930s Soviet Armenia’, Caucasus Analytical Digest, 22(1) (2010), pp. 6-9 [58] Ibid. [59] Eldar Ismailov, ‘1937: “Great Terror” in Azerbaijan’, Caucasus Analytical Digest, 22(1) (2010), pp. 9-13 [60] Ibid. [61] Or Beria’s approach – we can assume Beria to have largely acted with the permission, and support, of Stalin [62] Report of a UNPO Mission to Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Northern Caucasus, The Hague, Netherlands (1992) p. 28 cited in Alexander Murinson, ‘The secessions of Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabagh. The Roots and patterns of development of post-Soviet micro-secessions in Transcaucasia’, Central Asian Survey, 23(1) (2004), p. 18 [63] Stephen Jones, ‘The Establishment of Soviet Power in Transcaucasia: The Case of Georgia 1921-1928, Soviet Studies, 40(4) (1988), p. 618 [64] See ’Chronology of Abkhazia through August 1999‘, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington, D.C., (1999) [65] See p. 11 [66] Stephen Jones, ‘The Establishment of Soviet Power in Transcaucasia: The Case of Georgia 1921-1928, Soviet Studies, 40(4), (1988), pp. 617-618 [67] Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: Court of the Red Tsar (London: Phoenix, 2003), p. 206 cited in Matthew Lerner, ‘The Soviet Riviera: The Impact of Soviet Nationality Policy on Abkhazia, 1921-1953', Master’s research paper, University of Carleton, (2016), p. 43 [68] Ibid., p. 49 [69] Ibid. [70] Alexander Murinson, ‘The secessions of Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabagh. The Roots and patterns of development of post-Soviet micro-secessions in Transcaucasia’, Central Asian Survey, 23(1) (2004), p. 20 [71] Ibid. [72] Claude Mutafin, ’Karabagh in the twentieth century’ in Levon Chorbaijan, Patric Donabedian and Claude Mutafin, eds. The Caucasian Knot, (London: Zed Books, 1994), p. 142 cited in Alexander Murinson, ‘The secessions of Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabagh. The Roots and patterns of development of post-Soviet micro-secessions in Transcaucasia’, Central Asian Survey, 23(1) (2004), p. 21 [73] Ibid. [74] Alexander Murinson, ‘The secessions of Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabagh. The Roots and patterns of development of post-Soviet micro-secessions in Transcaucasia’, Central Asian Survey, 23(1) (2004), pp. 20-21