On the 29th November 1947, the UN General Assembly voted to partition Palestine. Following decades of struggle between its Jewish and Arab populations, plans for vague borders, non-defensible boundaries and a lack of continuous territory, brought with them an impetus towards violence from the offset.[1] In examination of its three phases, this essay offers a strategic analysis of Arab activity in the 1948 war that followed. Rejecting the traditional Zionist narrative of a battle between the Jewish David and Arab Goliath, attention will be drawn to the work of Israeli revisionists like Avi Shlaim in demonstrating the inaccuracy of the notion of a ‘monolithic’ Arab force.[2] Focusing on aims, strategy and tactics, this essay seeks to demonstrate two important points. First, that the conflicting national interests of Arab states means that the 1948 war might just as accurately be considered an inter-Arab conflict as one between a single united entity and the state of Israel. Second, and perhaps more significantly, throughout every phase of the war, it was the Palestinians that suffered most acutely. Not only did the initial civil conflict mark the loss of their homeland, their hopes for salvation with wider Arab intervention in May 1948 failed to come to fruition. While Israeli and Arab scholarship tend towards the terms ‘The War of Independence’ and ‘The 1948 Palestine War’, for the roughly 800,000 Palestinian refugees it created, ‘al-Nakba’ is the most accurate description available.
Phase 1: November 1947 – May 1948
The war began as a civil, inter-communal conflict between Palestinian and Jewish populations. With both parties triggered into action by the partition resolution, the months that followed are characterised by a period of fierce, bitter combat between two communities at war over what both believed to be their rightful homeland. It is on the basis of this conviction that Palestinian aims for the conflict were built. Simply put, ordinary Palestinian citizens sought to prevent the establishment of an Israeli state, ensuring the safety of their people. By actively combatting the decisions of the UN General Assembly, they aimed to prevent encroachment and ensure the Jewish population remained a minority, both in number and land ownership. For the Palestinian Arabs involved in the war’s earliest phase, this was a matter of survival.
While the term ‘strategy’ might appear something of a misnomer when discussing military activities at this stage, even with limited weaponry (arms had been confiscated by the British during the 1936-39 Revolt) and a weak societal structure,[3] Palestinians had begun to engage. From a military perspective, the roughly 7000-strong Arab force (consisting of Palestinian citizens and volunteers from the Arab Liberation Army led by Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni),[4] implemented a strategy based on intercommunal violence and limitation of the Jewish population. The rudimentary military capabilities of the Palestinian forces meant their strategy translated into guerrilla-style tactics targeting Jewish areas of cities with mixed populations.[5] Lacking the capacity for large-scale offensives on military bases and the like, ordinary Palestinian citizens instead took to the streets to launch close-contact attacks on their Jewish neighbours. Owing to their better-equipped nature, the tactics of the ALA instead focused on implementing their strategy of limiting Zionist forces through blockading and isolation, targeting main roads around the city of Jerusalem and cutting off supplies to the 100,000 Jewish residents inside.[6]
From a political perspective, the Palestinian strategy was more nuanced. Characterised by the creation of institutions and efforts to tarnish Israel’s image to target wider Arab sympathies, Palestinians began to take political steps towards ensuring their long-term success. Their first tactic involved the establishment of committees. Following the partition resolution, citizens in cities such as Lydda and Tiberias had started to organise in preparation to defend their homeland. From Local Security Committees designed to guard against Jewish thieves, to more localised Neighbourhood Committees responsible for patrols and barricades, Palestinian communities created organisational bodies to bolster their position in the conflict.[7] The most significant tactic of their political strategy, however, involved the use of the press. On April 9th1948, 130 fighters from the far-right Zionist groups Irgun and Lehi murdered roughly 107 Palestinian Arabs in what would become known as the Deir Yassin massacre.[8] Beyond an example of Israeli violence, the significance of this event lies in the way it was portrayed by Palestinian media. In broadcasts devoted to exaggerating the brutality (including vivid accounts of ‘atrocity’ and ‘rape’),[9] Palestinians were successful in capturing Arab sympathies across the Middle East, effectively implementing their political strategy of garnering support in the hopes of sparking intervention. The problem lay in the propaganda’s impact on Palestinian morale. As citizens were greeted with unflinching accounts of Zionist brutality, fear spread. By the time Arab states finally invaded Israel in May 1948, 200,000 Palestinians had already fled, leaving their limited forces weaker than ever before.[10]
A Turning Point – Israeli Declaration of Independence: May 14th 1948
On May 14th 1948, the British Mandate ended and Israel declared its independence. The following day, Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, and Iraq invaded, and the civil conflict was transformed into an interstate war. While it was Israel’s new status that sparked this shift in dynamics, the motivations behind Arab invasion are numerous. The events of Deir Yassin had sparked a turning point in Arab sentiment. With King Abdullah’s announcement promising ‘terrible consequences’ if similar incidents were to occur,[11] and growing public demand for action within neighbouring Arab states, Zionist violence could no longer be tolerated. Consider this alongside Israel’s increasingly offensive strategy (it seemed that with the implementation of Plan Dalet, without intervention the Haganah’s expansion would only continue),[12] and the progressively desperate situation of the Palestinian forces, and Israel’s declaration of independence is best understood as the final trigger for an invasion that had long been imminent.
Phase 2 - Interstate Conflict: May 15th 1948 – March 1949
While the invasion of regular armies from Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq (with additional contingents from Saudi Arabia and Algeria) did indeed transform the war into an interstate conflict, clarification must be made regarding the accuracy of these phases from a Palestinian perspective. On the aims and strategy of the ordinary Palestinian fighter, wider Arab intervention had little impact. Still seeking to reduce the number of Jews in Palestine and now resist the newly established Zionist state, their conflict remained one grounded in intercommunal fighting for home and survival.
While Palestinian forces were united in their aims, the same cannot be said for the Arab states. On the 15th May 1948, the Arab League addressed the United Nations in a cablegram outlining the logic behind their invasion. Citing principles like the Palestinian ‘right to set up a Government’ and the need to re-establish ‘peace and order’,[13] their stated aims appeared morally aligned with their Palestinian counterparts. However, while they shared a rhetorical commitment to the liberation of Palestine, and most were united in plans to oppose the new state of Israel, the reality of Arab aims was quite different. King Abdullah saw the 1948 war as an opportunity to increase his territory via the annexation of the Arab parts of Palestine. Hoping to increase his standing in the region, it was national selfishness, as opposed to a genuine dedication to a Palestinian state, that motivated him.[14] Acutely aware of Transjordan’s territorial aspirations, both Syria and Egypt entered the conflict with the intention of checking their neighbour’s ambitions. King Farouk and President Shukri al-Quwwatli were concerned at not only the prospect of a Jordanian-controlled Arab Palestine, but the possibility of Abdullah using this success to realise wider ambitions of a Greater Syria. Acting against the advice of their own governments, Syria and Egypt’s most important aim was thus maintaining the balance of inter-Arab politics in order to prevent encroachment on their own territory and authority.[15] While both Lebanon and Iraq are often relegated to the footnotes in discussions of the Arab-Israeli war (their military capacity and subsequent involvement in the conflict was limited), they too recognised the need to temper Abdullah’s ambitions.[16] It is with this disparity in mind that attention must be drawn to the inaccuracy of the traditional Zionist David and Goliath narrative. In sharp contrast to the notion of a monolithic Arab entity, the 20-25,000 strong Arab force was both deeply divided in its ambitions and vastly different in its capabilities.[17] As the conflict continued, not only did Palestinian aims fall victim to the national interests of their stronger Arab neighbours, the friction between states also became increasingly apparent. Although Arab armies did not openly engage in combat, their hostility and incompatible aims meant the 1948 war can just as accurately be described as an inter-Arab conflict.[18]
The overarching Arab military strategy during this phase was based on the basic principle of divide and conquer. While Palestinian irregulars maintained their approach of localised intercommunal violence, the invading Arab states sought to overwhelm Israeli forces in order to establish a superior position for negotiations and expansion. From a tactical perspective, this meant a process of attacking, annexing and occupying Israeli settlements from different angles. The realisation of this overarching strategy, however, differed between states. Adopting a tactic of swift attacks on key Jewish settlements like Nirim, the Egyptian army was tasked with invading the southern front and the Negev.[19] Syria adopted a similar approach in the northern front. Occupying three distinct enclaves totalling 66.5km, the Syrian regular army targeted indefensible strips of land east of the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias that they knew could swiftly be obtained.[20] The same military tactics of targeted assaults and attempted occupation were employed by Lebanon and Iraq in their respective engagements at Malikiyya in June 1948 and the approach towards Netanya. The progress of these regular Arab armies, however, was somewhat minimal. While not entirely devoid of success (take Iraq’s victory at the Battle of Jenin as an example), in most cases their advances were limited. With the size of the Iraqi army forcing it to take on a defensive position soon after its success,[21] Lebanon’s small force preventing much involvement beyond their half-day battle at Malikiyya,[22] Quwwatli’s fear of leaving Syria weak to Abdullah’s ambitions lending itself to a policy of cautious deployment (only 2500 Syrian troops invaded),[23] and the Egyptian army’s limited experience as a parade ground troop,[24] these forces hardly represented a Goliath-like entity.
A highly professional army led by well-trained officers, the Jordanian Arab Legion is perhaps the exception. Targeting the areas Abdullah hoped to annex in line with his aim of territorial expansion, it focused its efforts on the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Adopting tactics of occupation in key strategic positions like the Latrun Monastery and house-to-house fighting in Jerusalem, Commander Glubb Pasha demonstrated the Legion’s substantial military capabilities in fierce engagements with Zionist forces, deployment of extensive artillery and success in pushing Jewish citizens from the Arab areas of Jerusalem.[25] On the basis of this potential for success, the question arises as to the logic behind Arab defeat in the 1948 war. The answer lies in Transjordan’s political strategy. Motivated by his desire for expansion, King Abdullah adopted a tendency to play the field for selfish return. While the nature of Zionist-Hashemite collusion has been debated by historians, even the likes of Efraim Karsh who is quick to point out the superficial nature of these communications, does not deny their existence. In a secret meeting between King Abdullah and Golda Meir on the 17th November 1947, discussions were had regarding the division of Palestine between Israel and Transjordan following the end of the Mandate.[26] Although the reality of co-operation between the two states was unlikely, Transjordan’s self-interested tactics of colluding with the enemy laid the foundations for mutual restraint in the war that followed, betraying Palestinian hope for liberation and ensuring the Arab Legion’s aversion to any substantial engagement with Zionist forces.[27]
Phase 3 - The Point of No Return: 11th June 1948
On the 11th June, the first ceasefire of the 1948 war was called by the UN Security Council. While the attempts at compromise led by Count Folke Bernadotte ultimately proved unsuccessful, this event marked an irreparable shift in power dynamics. Having used the pause in the conflict as an opportunity to regroup, Israel began to import weaponry from Europe. In spite of the limited capacity of the Arab regular armies, their various military successes up to this point meant that Zionist victory had not yet seemed an inevitability. By the time the second ceasefire was concluded, this was no longer the case. With Israel having improved their position so significantly that Zionist forces switched to an offensive military strategy, Arab armies were forced to abandon their wider aims and adopt defensive positions. By December 1948, Israel had seized Nazareth and most of Galilee and broken the Egyptian blockade in the Negev.[28] Although armistice agreements were not signed until March, the 11th June marked the beginning of the end for Arab forces.
Assessment - The Implications of Arab Strategy
The success of Arab aims in the 1948 war were mixed. With Zionist victory succeeding in legitimising the state and its borders increasing by 21%, hopes of opposing Israel and avoiding its domination of the region were dashed. While Syria and Egypt succeeded in preventing the creation of Abdullah’s Greater Syria, their attempts to halt Transjordanian expansion failed as the King emerged from the conflict with control of both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While this territorial victory is evidence of Transjordan’s success in achieving some of its national aims, the impact of Arab defeat left the state’s leadership in a vulnerable position. Although Abdullah had hoped his achievements would cement his standing, his assassination in 1951 demonstrates the consequences of his strategy.[29] As a result of their limited military capabilities, misguided expectations of an easy victory resulting from a lack of long-term planning (Egyptian Generals commented that invasion would be a ‘parade without any risks’),[30] and inability to work together, Arab success in 1948 was minimal and their strategy flawed.
It was, however, the Palestinians that emerged from the conflict in the worst position of all. Having entered a war they were unprepared for in every way a nation could be unprepared,[31] their aims of preventing the creation of an Israeli state and ensuring Palestinian survival failed. While there is much debate over the reasoning behind the exodus that followed, regardless of its causes, Palestinians emerged from 1948 as a nation of refugees. Both a result of their own flawed strategy (their propaganda sparked fear and their military capacity was limited) and the self-interested approach of Arab states, having struggled to defend their position against a superior Israeli force since November 1947, the Palestinian population ultimately found itself without a home, with between 550,0000-800,000 of its citizens spread out across the Middle East.[32]
The significance of this war cannot be overstated. Palestinian belief in their right to a homeland has provided an infinite catalyst for Middle Eastern conflict for decades. With the events of 1948 giving rise to both the notion of Palestinian nationalism and key ideological tenets such as muqawama (resistance) and ‘awada (return), the conflict sparked a determination amongst Palestinians to regain what they had lost.[33] As the rest of the Arab world continued to debate the solution to the refugee crisis, the question of a Palestinian state found its place at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. From setting the precedent for Israel’s victim narrative, sparking a destabilising domino effect on Arab politics and leaving the Palestinian population as a nation without a home, the impact of the 1948 war can be felt to this very day.
Harriet Solomon has recently graduated with an MA in Modern History from the London School of Economics.
Notes:
[1] Kirsten E. Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 17.
[2] Ibid, p. 289.
[3] Issa Khalaf, ‘The Effect of Socio-economic change on Arab Societal Collapse in Mandate Palestine’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1977), p. 94.
[4] Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 163.
[5] Mustafa Abbasi, ‘The end of Arab Tiberias: The Arabs of Tiberias and the Battle for the City in 1948’, Journal for Palestine Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2008), p. 18.
[6] Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, p. 163.
[7] Spiro Munayer, ‘The Fall of Lydda’, Journal for Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1998), p. 83.
[8] Benny Morris, ‘The Historiography of Deir Yassin’, Journal of Israeli History, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2005), p. 79.
[9] Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 21.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 126-128.
[12] Walid Khalidi, ‘Plan Dalet: Masterplan for the conquest of Palestine’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, Special Issue: Palestine 1948 (1988), p. 9.
[13] United Nations Security Council, Cablegram Dated 15 May 1948 Addressed To The Secretary-General By The Secretary General Of The League Of Arab States, S/745, (1948), <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/DER/NL4/829/25/PDF/NL482925.pdf?OpenElement>, [Accessed 01 March 2021].
[14] Avi Shlaim, ‘The Debate about 1948’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1995), p. 300.
[15] Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim, The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 150 and pp. 177-178.
[16] Ibid, p. 204.
[17] Kirsten E. Schulze, ‘The 1948 War: The Battle over History’ in Joel Peters and David Newman, Israel-Palestine Handbook (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 48-49.
[18] Rogan and Shlaim, The War for Palestine, p. 198.
[19] Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War, p. 236.
[20] Rogan and Shlaim, The War for Palestine, pp. 196-197.
[21] Efraim Karsh, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Palestine War 1948 (London: Osprey, 2002), p. 60.
[22] Rogan and Shlaim, The War for Palestine, p. 204.
[23] Ibid, pp. 195-196.
[24] Schulze, ‘The 1948 War: The Battle over History’, p. 49.
[25] Karsh, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 62.
[26] Efraim Karsh, ‘The Collusion that never was: King Abdallah, the Jewish Agency and the Partition of Palestine’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1999), p. 570.
[27] Schulze, ‘The 1948 War: The Battle over History’, p. 50.
[28] Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 18.
[29] Ibid, pp. 20-21.
[30] Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War, p. 185.
[31] David Tal, War in Palestine, 1948: Israeli and Arab Strategy and Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 470.
[32] Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 21.
[33] Sela Avraham and Alon Kadish, ‘Israeli and Palestinian Memories and Historical Narratives of the 1948 War – An Overview', Israel Studies, Vol. 21, No. V1 (2016), p. 6.